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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this case, the district court relinquished jurisdiction over Jeremy Guzman solely
because he did not participate in a new psycho sexual evaluation and a new full-disclosure
polygraph during his period of retained jurisdiction. That decision runs directly contrary to
several recent decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. 1
Specifically, the district court's "order" for the new evaluation was not sufficiently clear
or distinct to be enforceable as the basis for relinquishing jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the

decision to relinquish jurisdiction impermissibly punished Mr. Guzman for his silence in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Either way, this Court should reverse the decision to
relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Guzman.
Mr. Guzman also contends the district court violated his right to due process in this
appeal by failing to maintain an adequate record of the proceedings.

Specifically, it failed to

retain copies of several letters which the district court expressly considered at the rider review
hearing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Guzman pled guilty to one count of lewd conduct with
a person under the age of sixteen. (R., p.53; see R., pp.58-59.) That constituted Mr. Guzman's

1

At the time of the decision in Mr. Guzman's case, this same district court judge had been
reversed three times for making this same error. State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, _ , 426 P.3d
461, 467 (2018); State v. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho 534, 538-40 (2016); State v. Reed, 163 Idaho
681, 685-87 (Ct. App. 2018). Mr. Guzman's case is also not the only one currently pending on
appeal which includes this issue by the same district court judge, as it also appears to be an issue
in State v. Allmaras, Supreme Court Docket Nos. 45821 and 46817, Kootenai County Case No.
CR-2014-20024. (See Appellant's Second Notice of Appeal, filed Feb. 26, 2019.)
1

first felony conviction. 2

As such, the PSI author rated him as a low risk to reoffend.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.53.)3 Several of Mr. Guzman's family
and friends wrote letters of support prior to the sentencing hearing. (See Order Granting Motion
to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated May 14, 2019 (ordering those letters be
augmented as confidential exhibits).)
During the presentence process, Mr. Guzman participated in a psychosexual evaluation in
which he scored 2 on the STATIC-99R based on his history of impulsiveness or recklessness,
and the fact that the victim in this case was not related to him. (PSI, pp.20-21.) That placed him
in the low-moderate category of risk in regard to static, or unchangeable, factors. (PSI, p.20.)
He scored a 4 on the STABLE-2007 based on his poor emotional regulation, his poor impulse
control, his poor insight, his attitude supporting sexual offending, and his lack of a feasible plan
to prevent reoffending. (PSI, pp.20-22.) That placed him in the moderate category of risk with
regard to dynamic, or changeable, factors. (PSI, p.20.) The evaluator noted that Mr. Guzman
was amenable to treatment. (PSI, p.13.) The combination of his two scores placed him in the
moderate category for sexual recidivism.

(PSI, p.13.)

Mr. Guzman also participated in a

polygraph examination as part of that evaluation, and he was determined to have answered
truthfully. (PSI, p.21.)

2

Mr. Guzman's only other lifetime conviction (for malicious injury to property) had been
dismissed pursuant to a withheld judgment. (PSI, pp.44-45.)
3
"PSI" refers to the electronic PDF file which contains the PSI itself, as well as other
evaluations, such as the report from Mr. Guzman's psychosexual evaluation.

2

At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Guzman requested the district court suspend his sentence
for a period of probation, or alternatively, retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.11, L.23 - p.12, L.2.) 4 The
district court followed the latter recommendation, retaining jurisdiction while imposing an
underlying sentence of twenty-five years, with four years fixed. (Tr., p.17, Ls.12-18.) It told
Mr. Guzman, "I won't consider probation a year from now when you come back if you don't
have a full disclosure polygraph," and "I guarantee you I will impose your prison sentence if you
don't come back here with a new psychosexual evaluation, verified by a full disclosure
polygraph." (Tr., p.17, Ls.20-22, p.20, Ls.10-13.) Specifically, the district court wanted to see if
Mr. Guzman could reduce the risk of sexual recidivism identified in the psychosexual evaluation.
(See Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.7.) The district court addressed this issue in the Judgment of
Conviction, stating:

THE COURT RECOMMENDS for the defendant SEX OFFENDER
ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT, WITH AN OPINION AT THE END
OF THAT ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT AS TO HIS RISK TO
REOFFEND.
THE COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER PROBATION AT THE END OF
THE PERIOD OF RETAINED JURISDICTION WITHOUT A NEW
FULL-DISCLOSURE POLYGRAPH AND NEW PSYCHOSEXUAL
EVALUATION.
(R., p. 69 (emphasis and capitalization from original).)
Mr. Guzman performed well during his period of retained jurisdiction. (See generally
PSI, pp. 84-89.) He was active in, and successfully completed, all the classes to which he was

assigned as part of his rider program. (PSI, pp.85-86.) He also completed other elective classes
designed to improve his ability to get a job when released. (PSI, p.86.) Mr. Guzman explained

4

Unless otherwise noted, references to "Tr." in this brief will be to the volume containing the
transcripts of the December 5, 2017, sentencing hearing and the August 16, 2018, rider review
hearing.
3

that he had learned what decisions had led to his underlying offense, and "I have learned how to
cope with my urges and how to communicate my feelings in an effective manner," and that he
now had "the tools that I need to be successful out there." (PSI, p.88; Tr., p.27, Ls.4-10.)
The rider staff concluded that Mr. Guzman appeared "to have made some positive
changes in [his] thinking patterns, attitudes, and beliefs." (PSI, p.89.) They also clarified his
only disciplinary report was actually made in error by the staff, as the alleged violation was, in
fact, Mr. Guzman taking advantage of a privilege he and his classmates had earned through good
behavior. (PSI, p.86.) Overall, the rider staff reported that he "presented an acceptable Success
Plan" and "[h]is risk to reoffend is statistically in the low risk range." (PSI, p.88.) As a result,
they recommended he be placed on probation. (PSI, p.84.)
At the rider review hearing, the district court noted it had received several more letters,
which it had considered. (Tr., p.27, Ls.11-18.) Those letters were not included in the appellate
record, but based on the district court's description, it appears that several were written by people
who had written the letters of support at the initial sentencing hearing. ( Compare Tr., p.27,
Ls.11-18 with Tr., p.6, L.24 - p.7, L.2.) Defense counsel argued that Mr. Guzman had addressed
the concerns the district court identified at the initial sentencing hearing, implying the district
court should suspend his sentence as a result. (See Tr., p.26, Ls.3-14.)
The district court acknowledged Mr. Guzman's good performance in the rider program,
but it still decided to relinquish jurisdiction because "my order says I will not consider probation
at the end of the period of retained jurisdiction without a new full disclosure polygraph, new
psychosexual evaluation." (Tr., p.28, Ls.7-10.) The district court claimed that, without that
particular evaluation, it did not have any more insight as to the risk Mr. Guzman would present
to society. (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-5; but see, e.g., PSI, pp.88-89 (reporting that Mr. Guzman had made

4

progress during the rider program and statistically fell in the "low risk range").) That was the
only rationale it gave for its decision. (See generally Tr.)
In response, defense counsel noted that the period of retained jurisdiction did not expire
for several more months, and so, asked if the district court would be willing to hold off on its
decision to relinquish jurisdiction while Mr. Guzman got a new psychosexual evaluation.
(Tr., p.29, Ls.12-18.) The district court refused, reiterating: "here's what's in my order: That I
won't consider probation at the end of the period of retained jurisdiction without a new full
disclosure polygraph and a new psychosexual evaluation.

We're here for your retained

jurisdiction review hearing. I don't have those." (Tr., p.29, Ls.19-25.)
The district court did indicate it might reconsider the issue as part of a motion for
modification under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (Tr., p.30, Ls.5-6.) Mr. Guzman actually filed such
a motion based on the report from a new psychosexual evaluation. (R., p.801; PSI, pp.111-21.)
That evaluation concluded Mr. Guzman had actually reduced his risk from moderate to lowmoderate, and he still answered truthfully on the associated polygraph.

(PSI, pp.111-21.)

During the hearing on that motion, Mr. Guzman testified and specifically asked the district court
to shorten the determinate term of his sentence so that he could participate in additional
programming before ultimately being released back into the community, rather than being
immediately released from custody. (I.C.R. 35 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-16.) Nevertheless, the district court
made it clear that it would not have reconsidered its decision to not put Mr. Guzman on
probation, even in light of the new psychosexual evaluation. (I.C.R. 35 Tr. p.13, Ls.1-9.) It did,
however, reduce the indeterminate portion of Mr. Guzman's sentence from twenty-one years to
sixteen years. (I.C.R. 35 Tr. p.12, Ls.10-16.)

5

Mr. Guzman filed a notice of appeal timely from the resulting order relinquishing
jurisdiction. (R., pp.78, 82.) On appeal, he filed a motion to augment the record with copies of
the letters the district court considered at the rider review hearing. (Motion to Augment and
Suspend, filed May 10, 2019. ) 5 The Supreme Court initially granted that motion, suspending the
briefing schedule until copies of those letters could be provided by the district court. (Order
Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated May 14, 2019.)
However, it subsequently entered an order denying that motion, explaining:

"the Kootenai

County District Court Clerk is unable to locate the five Letters of Support apparently filed on
August 2, 2018, in Odyssey, and the case file was previously scanned and shredded." (Order Re:
Augmentation, dated May 17, 2019.) The online repository has an entry for August 2, 2018,
which simply says "scanned," and it does not contain any notices that exhibits in the file were
pending destruction.

5

Appellate counsel has reached out to Mr. Guzman's trial attorney to see if he might still have a
copy of the letters, but, as of this date, has not received a response in that regard.

6

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred by relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Guzman based
solely on the fact that he did not participate in a new psychosexual evaluation and fulldisclosure polygraph examination during the period of retained jurisdiction.

II.

Whether the district court failed to preserve a sufficient record for appeal, thereby
depriving Mr. Guzman of his right to due process in this appeal.

7

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over Mr. Guzman Based Solely On The
Fact That He Did Not Participate In A New Psychosexual Evaluation And Full-Disclosure
Polygraph Examination During The Period Of Retained Jurisdiction

A.

Standard Of Review
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). However, questions of due process within that analysis are

reviewed de novo. See State v. Svelmoe, 160 Idaho 327, 330 (2016). The district court abuses its
discretion when: (1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; (2) it acts beyond the
outer bounds of its discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, or
(4) it reaches its decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,
863-64 (2018). In this case, the district court failed to act consistent with the applicable legal
standards.

B.

The District Court's Order Placed Mr. Guzman In The Classic Penalty Situation, And As
A Result, The Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction Over Mr. Guzman Because He Did
Not Participate In A New Psychosexual Evaluation And Polygraph Violated His Fifth
Amendment Rights
This Court should vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction because that order violated

Mr. Guzman's Fifth Amendment rights. The Fifth Amendment privilege is, after all, "'as broad
as the mischief against which it seeks to guard,' and that privilege is only fulfilled when a
criminal defendant is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence."' Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892),

and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964), respectively) (ellipsis from Estelle). The Idaho

8

Supreme Court has recognized that this right specifically applies when a defendant is asked to
participate in a psychosexual evaluations. See Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564 (2006). As
such, a defendant may not be punished for not waiving that right and participating in a
psychosexual evaluation. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho at 538-40.
The reason the Fifth Amendment protections apply to psychosexual evaluations is that
there is a risk that the person responding to that evaluation will incriminate themselves while
answering those questions, particularly when the questions are asking about sexual contact with
minors. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562; Van Kamen, 160 Idaho at 538. For example, the Idaho
Supreme Court has explained that a person answering questions about acts amounting to lewd
conduct, as Mr. Guzman was doing, could also easily admit conduct amounting to sexual battery
of a child under sixteen ifhe admitted to (with the requisite intent) touching the victim in another
way which did not amount to lewd conduct. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho at 538.
Moreover, such admissions could easily result in additional criminal charges.

For

example, the Idaho Supreme Court has upheld multiple convictions for lewd conduct with a
minor and the infamous crime against nature even though the charged conduct all occurred in the
victim's bedroom as part of the same overarching incident. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 25
(1997). The Court held that, because the acts occurred in different parts of the victim's bedroom,
they were sufficiently separate and distinct to justify separate convictions. Id. The Court of
Appeals conducted a similar analysis when it upheld separate convictions for male rape and
battery with intent to commit a serious felony even though the charged conduct all occurred
within a prison cell as part of the same overarching incident. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 65861 (Ct. App. 2014).

That same analysis could be applied to the conduct identified in Van

9

Kamen.

Therefore, there is a risk of self-incrimination in answenng questions during a

psychosexual evaluation, and thus, the Fifth Amendment applies.
While the Fifth Amendment's protections may be available to a person in that scenario, a
person also usually needs to invoke the Fifth Amendment in order to benefit from its protections.
Reed, 163 Idaho at 685. However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception

to that requirement exists when the person is subjected to the "classic penalty situation."
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984). The classic penalty situation is a Catch-22

scenario where the defendant must choose between being punished for not talking and being
punished based on the statements he would make if he did talk. Id. at 434 (explaining that
classic penalty situation arose when "the state ... sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth
Amendment privileged by threating to impose economic or other sanctions capable of forcing the
self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids"). 6 The classic penalty situation also arises
even where "the attempt to override the witnesses' privilege proved unsuccessful" or "the state
could not constitutionally make good on its prior threat." Id.
The extension of a term of incarceration is a sufficient penalty to trigger the Fifth
Amendment's protections. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 38 (2002) (plurality opinion);
McKune, 536 U.S. at 52 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (though, like the plurality, ultimately

concluding the Fifth Amendment was not violated in that particular case); see also Van Kamen,
160 Idaho at 540 (noting that, according to both Justice O'Connor and the four dissenting
justices in McKune, "any penalty for asserting the right to remain silent that was likely to compel
an incriminating statement violates the Fifth Amendment") (emphasis added). Therefore, the

6

The courts are state actors, and so, when "the state" bears an obligation to enforce a defendant's
rights, such as the one Murphy identifies, the courts are included within the term "the state." See
State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 334 (2011).
10

decision to relinquish jurisdiction, rather than place a defendant on probation, based on his
failure to participate in a psychosexual evaluation constitutes a penalty for not waiving his Fifth
Amendment rights. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho at 540; Reed, 163 Idaho at 686; see also State v.
Powell, 161 Idaho 774, 780-81 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding that threating to withhold release on

parole if the defendant did not answer questions was a sufficient penalty to trigger the classic
penalty scenario), rev. denied.
The district court's actions at the sentencing hearing put Mr. Guzman into the classic
penalty scenario - it sought to pressure Mr. Guzman into forgoing his Fifth Amendment rights
and participate in a psychosexual evaluation and full-disclosure polygraph during the period of
retained jurisdiction by "guarantee[ ing]" him it would not release him from incarceration at the
end of that period if he did not make the desired disclosures.

(Tr., p.20, Ls.10-13; accord

Tr., p.17, Ls.20-22; R., p.69.) The Court of Appeals has indicated that such a threat would
trigger the classic penalty scenario, such that the failure to invoke the Fifth Amendment would
be excused under the classic penalty scenario. Le Veque, 2017 WL 5560270, **7-8 (vacated by
Le Veque, 426 Idaho at 466 (explaining the Court did not need to reach the constitutional

question because there was a non-constitutional basis upon which that decision should be
vacated)). 7 As a result, it would have held that following through on such a threat would violate
the Fifth Amendment. Id.

7

Since the Court of Appeals' analysis in Le Veque analysis in that regard was not contradicted or
rejected by the Supreme Court on review, it is provided here, not as controlling precedent, but as
a historical example of how one learned court has evaluated this precise question. Compare Staff
of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) ("When this Court had cause to consider
unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his
petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[ e].'
Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding
precedent but as an example, was appropriate.").
11

Since the district court put Mr. Guzman in the classic penalty situation, any failure to
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege should be excused. Thus, when the district court, in its
own words, relinquished jurisdiction solely because Mr. Guzman had not participated in a new
psychosexual evaluation or full disclosure polygraph (Tr., p.28, Ls.7-10, p.29, Ls.19-25), it
punished him for not speaking, and thereby violated his Fifth Amendment rights. 8 Compare Van
Komen, 160 Idaho at 540. As such, this Court should vacate that relinquishment order and

remand this case for further proceedings before a new district court judge. Id.

C.

Alternatively, The District Court's "Order" To Obtain A New Psychosexual Evaluation
And Polygraph Examination, Like Its "Order" In Le Veque, Was Not Sufficiently
Specific Or Definite Enough To Be The Basis For Relinquishing Jurisdiction
Even if this Court concludes the decision to relinquish jurisdiction did not violate the

Fifth Amendment, it should still reverse that decision because the "order" it was trying to enforce
by doing so was not sufficiently specific or definite to be enforceable. The Idaho Supreme Court
has noted that the district court has the power to enforce its "lawfully issued orders."9 Le Veque,
426 P.3d at 466 (citing, inter alia, State v. Garcia, 159 Idaho 6, 13 (2015)). However, to be

8

This remains true even in light of Mr. Guzman's subsequent motion for leniency. Since any
statements he made at that time would also have been the product of the district court putting
him the classic penalty situation, the subsequent motion for leniency does not cure the violation
at the relinquishment hearing. See Powell, 161 Idaho at 780-81 (affording relief to the defendant
even though he decided to answer questions after being put in the classic penalty situation).
9
The district court in this case did not have had the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in
Le Veque, as that opinion was issued approximately one month after the decision to relinquish
jurisdiction over Mr. Guzman. However, Le Veque did not announce a new rule; rather, it
applied the rule from prior cases. See generally Le Veque, 426 P.3d 461. As such, the order in
this case should be vacated because it is also contrary to those other decisions for the same
reasons articulated in Le Veque.
Moreover, the district court did have the benefit of the Court of Appeals' decision in
Le Veque, both when it initially sentenced Mr. Guzman and when it subsequently relinquished
jurisdiction over him. As discussed in Section I(B), supra, the Court of Appeals had vacated the
order relinquishing jurisdiction in that case because it violated the Fifth Amendment. See
Le Veque, 2017 WL 5560270.
12

enforceable, the order must be "' a specific and definite order of the court."' Id. at 467 (quoting

State v. Rogers, 143 Idaho 320, 322 (2006) (in tum quoting Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630,
636 (Ct. App. 1995))) (emphasis from Le Veque). That is because, if an order is not specific and
definite, then enforcing it would violate the "notions of fairness and due process." Id.; see

generally Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (reiterating that one of the fundamental
tenets of due process is sufficient notice of what the district court is doing and requiring).
In Le Veque, the Supreme Court held the provision in question was not sufficiently
specific or direct as to be enforceable as an order. Le Veque, 426 P.3d at 466. Specifically, the
provision in that case stated:

THE COURT SPECIFICALLY RECOMMENDS SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT AFTER HE FULLY DISCLOSES HIS INVOLVEMENT IN
HIS SOUTH DAKOTA CRIME, AND THAT HIS DISCLOSURE IS
VERIFIED WITH A POLYGRAPH.
Le Veque, 426 P.3d at 467 (emphasis and capitalization from original).

The provision in

Mr. Guzman's case is similar:

THE COURT RECOMMENDS for the defendant SEX OFFENDER
ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT, WITH AN OPINION AT THE END
OF THAT ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT AS TO HIS RISK TO
REOFFEND.
THE COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER PROBATION AT THE END OF
THE PERIOD OF RETAINED JURISDICTION WITHOUT A NEW
FULL-DISCLOSURE POLYGRAPH AND NEW PSYCHOSEXUAL
EVALUATION.
(R., p.69 (emphasis and capitalization from original).)
There were two problems with the provision in Le Veque. First, it was not sufficiently
specific because, by its plain language, it was a "recommendation," not an "order," for treatment
and verification:

"The Court specifically recommends sex offender treatment after he fully

discloses .... " Le Veque, 426 P.3d at 467 (emphasis and capitalization altered). In other words,
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because that provision did not use mandatory language (like “must” or “shall”), it was not clear
that anyone was actually being required to take action. Id. The lack of mandatory language was
particularly telling to the Le Veque Court because, it noted, the district court judge had used
mandatory language in other, sufficiently-specific orders.

Id.

Here, as in Le Veque, the

provision is, by its plain language, actually a recommendation: “the Court recommends for the
defendant sex offender assessment and treatment, with an opinion at the end of that assessment
and treatment as to his risk to reoffend.” (R., p.69 (emphasis and capitalization altered).)
Therefore, it was not sufficiently specific to be an order.
The second reason the Le Veque Court held the provision was not an enforceable order
was that it was not sufficiently distinct as to who it was commanding to take action. Le Veque,
426 P.3d at 467. Specifically, it was not clear as to whether it was directing the Department of
Correction to provide a polygraph to Mr. Le Veque during his treatment program, or whether it
was it directing Mr. Le Veque to acquire one on his own. See id. The same flaw exists in the
provision in Mr. Guzman’s case. The provision was not clear whether the district court was
directing the Department of Correction to provide Mr. Guzman with the opportunity participate
in a psychosexual evaluation and take a polygraph while he was in the rider program, or whether
it was directing Mr. Guzman to secure those evaluations himself. (See R., p.69.) Therefore, the
provision in this case was also not sufficiently distinct to be an enforceable order.
For either or both of those reasons, the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction based on Mr. Guzman’s failure to comply with an impermissibly-ambiguous “order,”
just as it did in Le Veque. Therefore, this Court should vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction
over Mr. Guzman and order this case be assigned to a different district court judge on remand for
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the same reasons it did in Le Veque. See Le Veque, 426 P.3d at 468 (citing Van Kamen, 160
Idaho at 540).

II.
The District Court Failed To Preserve A Sufficient Record For Appeal, Thereby Depriving
Mr. Guzman Of His Right To Due Process In This Appeal

A.

Standard Of Review
Questions regarding whether a person's due process rights have been violated are

questions of law over which appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Svelmoe, 160 Idaho
327, 330 (2016).

B.

The District Court Deprived Mr. Guzman Of Due Process On Appeal By Failing To
Maintain A Copy Of The Letters The District Court Considered At The Rider Review
Hearing
When a defendant exercises his statutory right to appeal in a criminal case, see I.C. § 19-

2801, he has a due process right to a record that is sufficient to review the proceedings below.
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002); accord Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985)
(quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956)). One of the fundamental components of
due process is a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552; Jasso v.
Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 796 (2011).
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that, when the appellate record does not
include all the documents and records presented to the trial court, the defendant-appellant has not
been afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard on appeal. Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822,
837-38 (2009) (also holding that trial counsel's failure to recognize and raise a due process
challenge in that scenario constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
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As such, the Idaho

Supreme Court has long since held that the appellate record needs to include “all papers, records,
and files presented to the trial court on the hearing of a contested motion.” Sheel v. Rinard, 91
Idaho 736, 738 (1967); accord I.A.R. 28(c). “It would be, as we have previously stated, a
hazardous endeavor for this court to rule upon an appeal without access to all relevant material
used in the hearing below.” Id. (citations omitted).
The transcript of the rider review hearing in Mr. Guzman’s case is clear that five letters
were submitted for the district court’s review in deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction, and
that the district court did, in fact, consider those letters. (Tr., p.27, Ls.11-18.) Therefore, those
letters need to be in the appellate record for the record to be sufficient to review the district
court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction. Smith, 146 Idaho at 837-38; Sheel, 91 Idaho at 738.
Unfortunately, those letters have not been preserved by the district court. (See Order Re:
Augmentation, dated May 17, 2019 (indicating the letters were not scanned into Odyssey and the
physical file has been destroyed).) Therefore, the district court failed to provide a sufficient
record for review, and so, deprived Mr. Guzman of a meaningful opportunity to be heard in his
appellate challenge to the order relinquishing jurisdiction.
The due process violation in that regard does not appear to be the result of a good faith
error since the destruction of those letters did not comport with the applicable rules. Idaho Court
Administrative Rule 38 is clear that exhibits in a criminal case may only be destroyed “following
ten days[’] notice to the parties after expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination
of an appeal, or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.”
I.C.A.R. 38(c). The missing letters would have been included in the record as confidential
exhibits. (See Order Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated
May 14, 2019.) As such, they are governed by I.C.A.R. 38(c).
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Since Mr. Guzman filed a timely notice of appeal from the order relinquishing
jurisdiction, the exhibits presented to the district court to consider in making that decision were
not eligible for destruction until after a determination was made in this appeal. LC.AR. 38(c).
And even if they were eligible for destruction, the district court still had to provide ten days'
notice before destroying them. Id. According to the online repository, no such notice was given
in this case. Compare State v. Hanson, 2017 WL 4855679, *3 n.2 (Ct. App. 2017) (noting that
certain exhibits had been destroyed in good faith in that case, as proper notice had been given to
the parties). 10 Therefore, the district court's actions violated LC.AR. 38(c).
However, the district court indicated that the physical file was destroyed after it was
scanned into the record.

Such a scanning would likely be governed by the Idaho Rules for

Electronic Filing and Service, which supersede other rules when there is inconsistency between
them. See, e.g., In Re: Order Amending Rule on Electronic Filing and Service, dated April 10,
2018, available at https://isc.idaho.gov/orders/Order_ Amending_E-Filing_Rule_04.30.18.pdf (a
copy of the electronic filing rules is attached to this order). However, those rules do not address
the destruction of physical records after they are scanned into Odyssey, nor do they otherwise
modify or contradict LC.AR. 38. See generally In Re: Order Amending Rule on Electronic
Filing and Service. Therefore, LC.AR. 38 still controls the handling of the physical file after it
is scanned into Odyssey. Thus, the destruction of those records was not excusable.
The lack of that specific information is prejudicial because Mr. Guzman is unable to
meaningfully argue that the district court failed to sufficiently consider the mitigating
information likely contained in those letters. In deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction, the

10

As an unpublished decision, Hanson is only provided here as a historical example, not as
precedent dictating a particular conclusion. Compare Nordling, 135 Idaho at 634 (quoting
Bourgeois, 119 Idaho at 617).
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district court needs to sufficiently “consider[] all of the circumstances to assess the defendant’s
ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to determine the course of action that will
further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection of society, deterrence, and retribution.” Statton,
136 Idaho at 137; see also State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510 (Ct. App. 1995) (“The purpose of
probation is rehabilitation.”). Support of family and friends is a factor which is to be considered
in mitigation because a defendant with that sort of support is more likely to be successful in the
rehabilitation process while on probation. See, e.g., State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App.
2010). The failure to give sufficient consideration to that sort of mitigation is a valid basis for
challenging the district court’s sentencing decisions. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320
(2006) (specifically identifying the failure to sufficiently consider the support of family as a basis
on which Idaho’s courts have previously ordered sentence modification on appeal).)
As several of the letters were written by the same people who wrote letters of support
prior to the initial sentencing hearing (compare Tr., p.27, Ls.11-18 with Tr., p.6, L.24 - p.7, L.2),
the reasonable inference is that they were letters of support. (See Order Re: Augmentation, dated
May 17, 2019 (describing them as letters of support).) Notably, those statements of support
could have directly addressed one of the dynamic risk factors identified in the initial
psychosexual evaluation – Mr. Guzman’s lack of a feasible plan to prevent reoffending. (PSI,
pp.21-22.) The authors of those letters could have specifically explained how they would
support Mr. Guzman and help keep him from reoffending. Compare Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817
(noting that statements supporting the defendant’s claim of innocence were not the same as
support offered in consideration of rehabilitation efforts). In so doing, those statements would
have reinforced the conclusion from the rider staff that Mr. Guzman had “an acceptable Success
Plan” for his release. (PSI, p.88.) With that combined information, Mr. Guzman could have
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shown the abuse of discretion recognized in Knighton – that the district court had refused to
consider, much less sufficiently consider, the mitigating evidence when it said it did not have any
more insight than it did at the initial sentencing hearing as to the risk Mr. Guzman might present
to society if released on probation. (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-5.) However, without knowing what the
authors of those letters offered in terms of support, Mr. Guzman cannot meaningfully pursue that
potentially-meritorious argument.
Moreover, under the applicable precedent, those letters will actually be presumed to
support the district court’s decision even though the likely inference is that they would contradict
it. Because the appellant has the burden to show error below, he “bears the burden of ensuring
that this Court is provided a sufficient record for review of the district court’s decision.”
Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 797, 790 (2003). When the appellant fails to carry that burden,
the missing documents will be presumed to support the district court’s decision. Id.; State v.
Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); but cf. State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 220 (2014)
(explaining the Supreme Court would not engage in the practice of concluding documents were
irrelevant then applying this presumption against the defendant based on the absence of those
documents from the appellate record). Due to no fault of his own, Mr. Guzman is unable to meet
his burden in that regard, but that still means the missing letters will be presumed to support the
decision to relinquish jurisdiction. Thus, not only can he not make the potentially-meritorious
argument on appeal, the district court’s failure to maintain a valid record will undermine any
residual remnant of that argument he could make in that regard in this appeal. As such, the
district court’s failure to maintain an adequate record has deprived him of due process in this
appeal.
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C.

The Proper Remedy For The Due Process Violation Is To Remand This Case, Either For
A New Relinquishment Hearing Where The Record Can Be Rebuilt, Or To Presume The
Missing Documents Would Support Mr. Guzman's Argument That The District Court
Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
The proper remedy for this deprivation of due process is to afford Mr. Guzman the

process that he lost.

In this case, that would mean remanding the case for a new hearing

regarding whether to relinquish jurisdiction, at which time, the missing documents can be represented or substantially similar documents presented for the district court's consideration and
maintained for appellate review of that decision (if such review is ultimately necessary). See
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19-20 (remanding so the defendant could be provided the missing records

then make his arguments in light of that information); Smith, 146 Idaho at 839-40 (same).
The alternative discussed in Easley- of simply not holding the absence of the documents
against the appellant - is not sufficient to remedy the due process violation in Mr. Guzman's
case. See Easley, 156 Idaho at 220. In Easley, the defendant still had access to all the relevant
information, and therefore, could still be meaningfully heard on appeal. See id. Here, however,
even if the letters are not presumed to support the district court's decision to relinquish
jurisdiction, Mr. Guzman would still be unable to present an argument that those letters show the
district court's decision was an abuse of its discretion. Therefore, even if the Easley remedy
were applied, Mr. Guzman would still not be afforded the requisite meaningful opportunity to be
heard in this appeal, and thus, still would be deprived of his right to due process. See Smith, 146
Idaho at 837-38; Sheel, 91 Idaho at 738.
Rather, if this Court were disinclined to remand the case for a hearing at which the record
could be rebuilt, it would have to expand on the equitable justification underlying Easley and
fashion a remedy which would afford the process that was lost, and that would mean actually
hearing the argument that was lost. In order to do that, this Court would need to reverse the
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presumption discussed in Gibson and Coma and presume that the missing letters would support a
claim that probation was appropriate in this case. Applying that remedy, it would show that the
district court failed to sufficiently consider the mitigating factors, since the only thing the district
court considered was the fact that Mr. Guzman did not participate in a new psychosexual
evaluation. That failure to sufficiently consider all the mitigating information constitutes an
abuse of the district court's discretion. See Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320.
Thus, under either potential remedy, this Court should vacate the order relinquishing
jurisdiction and remand this case in light of the district court's violation of Mr. Guzman's due
process rights in this appeal.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Guzman respectfully requests this Court vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction
and remand this case for further proceedings in front of a new district court judge.
DATED this 21 st day of June, 2019.

/ s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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